This timeline is based on information from the Coast Guard hearings. The primary intent is to create an easy visual aid to track when testifying individuals joined or left the company, when certain submersibles and hulls were in use, and when incidents of interest took place.
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Stockton Rush and Guillermo Söhnlein found Oceangate, with the goal to "create a fleet of 4 to 5 deep diving submersibles capable of carrying 5 people, available for charter anywhere in the world and with no dedicated mothership".
source: Guillermo Söhnlein's testimony
Guillermo and Stockton found Oceangate
In 2009, Oceangate purchased pre-built and classed submersible, the Antipodes. However, it was only classed for up to 300 meters. They called it their "training wheels" sub, because it did not fill the deep-diving goals of their company.
source: Guillermo Söhnlein's testimony
While operating Antipodes, they encountered their first road block: submersibles have to fit into one of following 3 categories to take paying passengers aboard: 1) adhere to very strict rules from the coast guard written specifically around the Atlantis Submarines, 2) a personal use vessel that only allowed the owner and non-paying guests aboard, 3) an Oceanagraphic Research Vessel (ORV) that only allowed the owner, crew, and marine researchers aboard. Even this classed, steel-hulled vessel didn't fit into any of those.
source: Guillermo Söhnlein's testimony
They also began talking to sub builders about how they could acquire submersibles--however, their business requirements (5 passengers, no dedicated mothership) conflicted with what any submersible builders were able to sell them. This is because pressure hulls are generall too small to fit 5 passengers, and too heavy to be transported without extremely specific equipment onboard of their transport ship.
This is where carbon fiber entered the conversation: hypothetically, it could create a pressure hull that was larger, but more lightweight at the same time.
source: Guillermo Söhnlein's testimony
In 2012, they moved to Miami and started experimenting with a business model that would eventually lead to the "Mission Specalist" roles. They registered the Antipodes as an ORV, and passengers would purchase a course from them to be considered "pilots" or "crew" and allowed on board the submersible. The coast guard reviewed this proposal and still found it to be "passenger for hire".
Shortly after this, they shut down operation in Miami and decided to stop diving the Antipodes, shifting focus to building their own submersible design.
source: Guillermo Söhnlein's testimony
Söhnlein steps down as CEO and leaves the company with Stockton. According to Söhnlein, this was because Stockton had an engineering background and the investors were mostly Stockton's friends.
source: Guillermo Söhnlein's testimony
Guillermo Söhnlein departs Oceangate
Oceangate purchased another pre-built and classed submersible, Lula, and extracts the hull to build a "practice submersible", Cyclops 1.
source: Guillermo Söhnlein's testimony
source: PRN
David Lochridge is brought into the company as an independent contractor. He is led to believe the company has a fully classed submersible, but finds instead Cyclops 1 which has been so heavily modified that every element of the sub except the hull was out of classification.
source: David Lochridge's testimony, part 1
David Lochridge joins Oceangate
David Lochridge is made a full time employee. He begins to develop a training protocol for other pilots, but is disturbed when he learns that the intention of the company is to make it possible to "qualify pilots in one day". Presumably as a possible way to certify paying "Mission Specialists" as crew instead of passengers.
source: David Lochridge's testimony, part 1
Tony Nissen applies for an engineering tech job, but is given the role of Engineering Director.
source: Tony Nissen's testimony, part 1
Tony Nissen joins Oceangate
Between spring and summer of 2016, Oceangate cut ties with the Applied Physics Lab, and began focusing on producing their original submersible completely in house under Tony Nissen's supervision. Tony Nissen did not get along well with Dave Dyer and personally pushed for this change.
source: David Lochridge's testimony, part 1
source: Tony Nissen's testimony, part 1
APL and Oceangate no longer working together
There was a dive to the Andrea Doria wreck summer of 2016, where Stockton decided last minute he wanted to act as pilot instead of David Lochridge. Stockton landed too close to the wreck, and they became stuck underneath some of the wreck debris. Lochridge was finally able to gain the controls and navigate them out of the situation, but after this incident Lochridge was removed from any communication about the Titan project and his relationship with Stockton became hostile.
source: David Lochridge's testimony, part 1
source: David Lochridge's testimony, part 2
As a side note, the inclusion of civilian passengers on this dive set off red flags for another employee, Matthew McCoy. He had a background in enforcing regulation around passenger vessels, and grew suspicious that Oceangate's business plan involved skirting these regulations. He confronted Stockton, bringing up his concerns about operating without a Certificate of Inspection (COI). Stockton replied, "I'll buy a congressman and my problems will go away". McCoy left the company because of this incident.
source: Matthew McCoy's testimony
Physical production on Cyclops 2 (AKA Titan) begins in 2016. It is the first submersible with a hull designed and built by Oceangate.
Parts of the Titan submersible begin to arrive at Oceangate offices in Everett, WA, for assembly. Many employees noticed defects and flaws in the submersible's design. Lochridge was very vocal about his concerns about the integrity and safety of many of the submersible pieces, especially because Stockton planned to test dive the submersible himself, and they were already selling tickets to Mission Specialists.
source: David Lochridge's testimony, part 2
source: David Lochridge's testimony, part 3
source: Tym Catterson's testimony, part 1
Bonnie Carl applies for a bookkeeping job, but is hired as head of Finance and HR. She also begins training with Lochridge to be a submersible pilot.
source: Bonnie Carl's Testimony
Bonnie Carl joins Oceangate
Stockton instructs David Lochridge to do a thorough quality inspection report of the Titan. Over the course of 2 weeks in January, Lochridge completes a 67-page document expressing all his concerns, which he goes over in detail in his testimony.
source: David Lochridge's testimony, part 2
Shortly after Lochridge submitts his quality inspection report, he is called into a meeting with all other department heads of the company to discuss his report. The call lasts for 2 hours, and ends with Lochridge being fired. The call is available to listen to in full.
David Lochridge leaves Oceangate
The fabricator of Oceangate's viewport window, Hydrospace Group INC, reached out to independent contractor Kemper Engineering Services during window production to review the viewport's safety based on design alone. KES found the design to be extremely lacking and prone to failure. Despite the negative review from KES, the window was used in the submersible for the entirety of its operation.
source: Bart Kemper's testimony - part 1, 2, 3
David Lochridge and Bonnie Carl had been concerned about this design and wanted to see the report, but Tony Nissen had refused to share it with them.
source: Bonnie Carl's Testimony
Accountant and pilot trainee Bonnie Carl quits in February of 2018, citing her shared safety concerns with Lochridge.
source: Bonnie Carl's Testimony
Bonnie Carl leaves Oceangate
In spring of 2018, the submersible was brought to the Bahamas to do test dives and was allegedly struck by lightning. Because the electronics in the device all had to be changed out, Oceangate was forced to cancel their summer passenger charters. Despite being struck by lightning, no tests or repairs were made to the hull.
source: Tony Nissen's Testimony, part 1
Tony Nissen noticed discrepancies in the strain gage data on the hull during testing in August of 2018, which prompted him analyze the data and write a report. His report concluded that the carbon fiber hull was flexing 37%-45% more than expected under pressure. Despite the findings that were clearly at odds with their baseline expectations, no corrections or modifications were made to the hull.
source: Tony Nissen's Testimony, part 2
Testing continued over the next year, as the accoustic and strain sensors were still giving unfavorable results. After one of the test dives in 2019 a crack in the hull was identified, rendering the hull unusable. The discovery of this crack and scrapping of the first hull caused a "Mission Specialist" Titanic Dive set for that summer to be cancelled.
However, Oceangate never told its customers that the hull had failed or had to be replaced; they claimed the reason for the dive's cancellation was "Loss of a Support Vessel".
This incident caused Tony Nissen to be fired; Stockton claimed the board said Nissen "should have known this would happen" and that "one of them had to go, and it's not going to be me [Stockton]".
source: Tony Nissen's Testimony, part 2
Tony Nissen leaves Oceangate
A new carbon fiber hull is comissioned and quiety replaces the original that failed. No significant engineering or structural changes are made to the hull before manufacturing another.
Steven Ross becomes Chief Scientist at Oceangate. He was brought in to "develop a viable science program using the Titan [submerisble]". His time aboard the submarine was "donated" by the Oceangate Foundation, and he was not compensated for his time with the company.
He felt the primary agenda of Oceangate was to visit the Titanic wreck.
source: Steven Ross's Testimony
During one of the dives in the 2022 season, an independent contracter on the communications team raised safety concerns. She was prompty fired for "not having an explorer mindset".
On one of the dives (referred to as "dive 80"), a loud bang was heard after the sub surfaced. The loud bang was dismissed as a piece of the exterior metal cradle shifting or popping back into .
Every subsequent dive showed an increased activity from the acoustic sensors, indicating that more carbon fiber filaments were breaking than usual.
Corresponding with the time of the loud bang, there was also a sudden shift in both axial ans radial strain data from the pressure hull.
The loud bang was brought up in the dive debrief by passengers, but was dismissed by Stockton because they weren't discussing surfacing yet. It was not discussed further in the meeting, disturbing Antonella and fueling her suspicion that the company was not taking safety seriously.
source: Steven Ross's Testimony
Tym Catterson, an independent contractor who had been sporadically working with Oceangate since they acquired the Antipodes, was present for the final set of dives. The final dive was the first meaningful dive they'd made of the season due to bad weather, and it was the first meaningful dive after the submersible was left outside on a freezing dock for several months. He was also present for the search and rescue part of the mission. Part one of his testimonial covers his first-hand perspective.
source: Tym Catterson's testimony, part 1
Söhnlein claims their innovation was not "the new technology", but instead "the business model" of charterable submersibles that are easier to transport and fit more people at once. I find it hilarious that they consider "doing something cheaper and on a bigger scale so you can make more money off of it" to be an innovation. Like is that not the goal of every tech bro business ever?! LMAO
It doesn't seem like the cost and time of proving carbon fiber to be a safe material factored at all into this equation. See the testimony of Roy Thomas, an engineer with the American Beaureau of Shipping, for information on how rigorous testing on unapproved materials must be.
One of the passengers onboard during this incident, Renata, also testified at the coast guard hearing. part 1, part 2. Her testimonial doesn't align with Lochridge's, but I don't find her to be credible because she downplays almost every major company mishap she was present for far beyond reason. Notably, she was very close with Stockton and still has stock in the company. While I don't think she's a reliable narrator, her testimony is still worth watching to get an idea of the kinds of people that were chartering this experience.
During her testimony, Bonnie Carl describes a board meeting she sat in on as, "more of a sales pitch" where Stockton showed them a slideshow and had progress updates about potential missions. She also remarked that the board members didn't really have backgrounds in Oceanic or Submersible design; they were mostly friends and family of Stockton Rush, with a few individuals who might give the "impression that Oceangate was working with the Coast Guard". This sounds extremely similar to the board of directors at Theranos: most were on the board because they believed in the vision of the company, or had invested quite a bit, instead of providing any kind of guidance about working in the industry.
Honestly, this call kinda needs a trigger warning if you've ever had a shitty boss or worked in a startup. As my husband puts it, "the thinly veiled CEO rage" is tangible and extremely distressing. It's a super revealing look into what it would have been like to work there, and the amount of abuse and browbeating well-meaning experts and employees got just for caring about human life.
The "Stachew" they keep referring to is a scientist who essentially dedicated his life to testing and proving that acrylic would be safe to use in passenger/commercial seafaring vessels. The reason he was "conservative" with his data was because he knew if it failed, the tragedy that followed would be his fault and he couldn't live with that. It's an air of gravity entirely missing from how Stockton approaches his submersible. He calls it a "joke" compared to a car or airplane.
Bart Kemper discusses Stachew in part 1 of his testimony, and is quite eloquent and clear in part 2 about why such rigorous testing is necessary not just to prove a material's integrity, but in which shapes and forms it's most effective at resisting stress.
it's also extremely haunting how their defense for their "experimental" design choices is always "we'll know it's stressed before it fails, so we can stop pushing it when it starts to show stress" KNOWING that there were several incidents (the cracking of hull 1, the loud bang and corresponding shift in strain data on dive 80 in 2022) that warned them failure was imminent. And they ignored them.
Tony Nissen has recieved a lot of criticism for his behavior at Oceangate--especially how he clashed with David Lochridge. While i don't agree with his decisions or work ethic, have a lot of empathy for him. Stockton's leadership style seemed to be a one-two punch of pitting people against each other, and picking epic shiny yes-man golden boys. that's really difficult to navigate in the workplace! i've seen the effects of this kind of abusive workplace behavior on people i love and it's really fucking devastating. never so devastating to keep you from standing up for what's right, tho, especially when lives are on the line. i have empathy, not sympathy xD